Whistleblowing (Record no. 27471)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01848naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8091215260910 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211164228.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | TING, Michael M |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35512 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Whistleblowing |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | May 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | By skipping managers and appealing directly to politicians, whistleblowers can play a critical role in revealing organizational information. However, the protection of whistleblowers can affect managers' abilities to provide employees with incentives to exert effort. This paper explores this tradeoff with a model of agency decision-making under incomplete information. In the game, an employee's effort determines a project's quality, and a manager chooses whether to approve the project and discipline the employee. The employee and politician wish for only good projects to be approved. By whistleblowing, an employee reveals the quality to a politician outside of the organization, who may override the manager's decision. A key finding is that from the politician's perspective, the benefits of whistleblower protections depend on the preferences of the manager. If the manager is inclined toward approving projects, then the costs of lower employee effort may outweigh the informational benefits of whistleblowing. The optimal policy may then be to ban whistleblowing. By contrast, when the manager is inclined toward rejecting projects, whistleblower protections prevent him or her from suppressing effort and are unambiguously beneficial |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 102, 2, p. 249-268 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, May 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080912 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1526^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081111 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1509^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
No items available.
