the Autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state (Record no. 27482)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
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| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8091216571610 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211164238.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MYERSON, Roger B |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35525 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | the Autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | February 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | A political leader's temptation to deny costly debts to past supporters is a central moral-hazard problem in politics. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to probe the consequences of this moral-hazard problem for leaders who compete to establish political regimes. In contests for power, absolute leaders who are not subject to third-party judgments can credibly recruit only limited support. A leader can do better by organizing supporters into a court which could cause his downfall. In global negotiation-proof equilibria, leaders cannot recruit any supporters without such constitutional checks. Egalitarian norms make recruiting costlier in oligarchies, which become weaker than monarchies. The ruler's power and limitations on entry of new leaders are derived from focal-point effects in games with multiple equilibria. The relationships of trust between leaders and their supporters are personal constitutions which underlie all other political constitutions |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 102, 1, p. 125-140 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, February 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080912 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1657^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081113 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1025^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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