Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed ceos : (Record no. 27745)
[ view plain ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01782naa a2200169uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8110416204210 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211164431.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 081104s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ZHANG, Yan |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35746 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed ceos : |
| Remainder of title | an empirical investigation |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Chichester, UK : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | John Wiley, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | August 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Why are some newly appointed CEOs (i.e., those with tenure of three years or less) dismissed while others are not? Drawing upon previous reseach on information asymmetry and adverse selection in CEO selection, I argue that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession, and as a result, must dismiss the appointee after succession when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of succession increases the likelihood of dismissal. With data on 204 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support this argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal (e.g., firm performance and political factors), the results show that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs is higher in outside successions and/or if the succession follows the dismissal of the preceding CEO. Further, if at the time of succession, the firm's board has a nominating committee that is independent and/or on which outside directors have few external directorships, the likelihood of dismissal is lower. Contributions to the CEO dismissal/succession literature are discussed |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Strategic Management Journal |
| Related parts | 29, 8, p. 859-872 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Chichester, UK : John Wiley, August 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01432095 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081104 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1620^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
No items available.
