Envy, comparison costs, and the economic theory of the firm (Record no. 28136)
[ view plain ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02304naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 9012818303610 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211164640.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 090128s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | NICKERSON, Jack A. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 36112 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Envy, comparison costs, and the economic theory of the firm |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Chichester, UK : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | December 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for managerial diseconomies of both scale and scope - arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments - that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ZENGER, Todd R |
| 9 (RLIN) | 36113 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Strategic management journal |
| Related parts | 29, 13, p. 1429-1449 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Chichester, UK : Wiley-Blackwell, December 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01432095 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20090128 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1830^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
No items available.
