The Impartiality of international judges : (Record no. 28384)
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999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | VOETEN, Erik |
9 (RLIN) | 36402 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | The Impartiality of international judges : |
Remainder of title | evidence from the European Court of Human Rights |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | November 2008 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Can international judges be relied upon to resolve disputes impartially? If not, what are the sources of their biases? Answers to these questions are critically important for the functioning of an emerging international judiciary, yet we know remarkably little about international judicial behavior. An analysis of a new dataset of dissents in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) yields a mixed set of answers. On the bright side, there is no evidence that judges systematically employ cultural or geopolitical biases in their rulings. There is some evidence that career insecurities make judges more likely to favor their national government when it is a party to a dispute. Most strongly, the evidence suggests that international judges are policy seekers. Judges vary in their inclination to defer to member states in the implementation of human rights. Moreover, judges from former socialist countries are more likely to find violations against their own government and against other former socialist governments, suggesting that they are motivated by rectifying a particular set of injustices. I conclude that the overall picture is mostly positive for the possibility of impartial review of government behavior by judges on an international court. Like judges on domestic review courts, ECtHR judges are politically motivated actors in the sense that they have policy preferences on how to best apply abstract human rights in concrete cases, not in the sense that they are using their judicial power to settle geopolitical scores |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | American political science review |
Related parts | 102, 4, p. 417-433 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2008 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
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Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20090226 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1523^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
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