Institutional Design and Information Revelation : (Record no. 30067)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01897naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 9092215285313 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211165436.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 090922s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | WHITFORD, Andrew B |
| 9 (RLIN) | 11328 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Institutional Design and Information Revelation : |
| Remainder of title | Evidence from Environmental Right-to-Know |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford Journals, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | apr. 2009 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | How governments design institutions for the revelation of information depends on how the costs and benefits are distributed across affected groups. In this study I examine the incidence of different kinds of constituencies and how governments give citizens access to information that affects them. A number of important studies have sought to understand the effect of such rules on the revelation of private information and policy outcomes, but we know little about the sources of those rules. Do the rules coincide with constituencies that benefit from their existence? Are they absent when strong constituencies can avoid bearing the costs of the rules? Using data on community "right-to-know" protections regarding environmental hazards, I compare the incidence of the benefits and costs of these design choices in the context of rules that reveal information and charge the cost of information revelation to the regulated community. The models show that the incidence of right-to-know protections depends on the presence or absence of constituencies that would enjoy their benefits or bear their costs. However, organizational costs limit the ability of affected constituencies to obtain institutional designs that reflect their interests |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART |
| Related parts | 19, 2, p. 189-205 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Oxford Journals, apr. 2009 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 10531858 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20090922 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1528^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | mayze |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20120517 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1420^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Geisneer |
No items available.
