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Peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations (Record no. 30865)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01675naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 9111315082837
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211165849.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 091113s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SAAM, Nicole J.
9 (RLIN) 38313
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxfordshire :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. April 2009
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. In this paper we present the peer co-ordination approach which we apply to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to contribute to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaing theory (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It assumes that EU integovernmental negotiations should be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty in which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy networks. In particular, we investigate the reasons why an EU government should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, we test five alternative hypotheses on peer selection (ex H1-H5). A random model provides us with a null model (H0) against which to test alternative models. We find that peer selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Bargaing theory; EU; Intergovernmental negotiations; Peer co-ordination; Policy networks
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SUMPTER, David
9 (RLIN) 38314
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of European Public Policy
Related parts 16, 3, p. 356-377
Place, publisher, and date of publication Oxfordshire : Routledge, April 2009
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 13501763
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20091113
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1508^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20091117
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1610^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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