Trawling for subsidies : (Record no. 31094)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01660naa a2200205uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 9112610585637 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211165949.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 091126s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BRANDT, Urs Steiner |
| 9 (RLIN) | 38437 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Trawling for subsidies : |
| Remainder of title | the alignment of incentives between fishermen and marine biologists |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Oxfordshire : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Routledge, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | October 2009 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In the fishing industry, fisherman traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). We analyse the outcome of a game where the biologists and the fishermen are informed about the true stock size while the decision-maker is not. Our model shows that interest groups, traditionally perceived as opponents, may have mutual interests. Solving the current deadlocks in the EU fishery negotiations highlights the need to reveal the true incentives that motivate stakeholders, such as the symbiosis and alignment of interests identified here. |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) | |
| Local note | coalition model; EU; fishery; interest groups; political economy |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | SVENDSEN, Gert Tinggaard |
| 9 (RLIN) | 21160 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Related parts | 16, 7, p. 1012-1029 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Oxfordshire : Routledge, October 2009 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 13501763 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20091126 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1058^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20091126 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1505^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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