Shaping the provision of outsourced public services : (Record no. 32164)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02357naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0032610300137 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211170745.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100326s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MARVEL, Mary K. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 32868 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Shaping the provision of outsourced public services : |
| Remainder of title | incentive efficacy and servce delivery |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Armonk : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | M.E. Sharpe, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | December 2009 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Local governments that contract out services are faced with a complex problem of developing an appropriate mix of incentives to elicit performance from a diverse set of service providers, including networks of other local governments, mission-driven nonprofit organizations, and profit-maximizing firms. This paper employs agency and stewardship theory to motivate an analysis of rewards and sanctions used in service delivery relationships. Our findings, consistent with principal-agent theory, indicate that a significant proportion of local governments in our sample employ high-powered incentives with for-profit firms. It is interesting to note, however, that governments with short-term relationships with for-profit firms do not utilize high-powered incentives. These incentives are found in longer duration contracts. In line with the predictions of stewardship theory, governments in our sample do not use high-powered incentives with other governments or nonprofit service providers. Low-powered incentives, primarily informal discussions with those providers, constitute the primary means by which the contracting government ensures that the necessary adjustments to service delivery are made. The efficacy of informal discussion with nonprofits and other governments diminished significantly with longer term contracts, leaving contracting governments with few tools to influence the behavior of their contracting partners. Trust, value congruence, and mission compatibility can explain the initiation of relationships with nonprofits and other governments but do not yet inform government officials about how such relationships can be maintained and enhanced. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MARVEL, Howard P. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 32869 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Public Performance & Management Review |
| Related parts | 33, 2, p. 183-213 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Armonk : M.E. Sharpe, December 2009 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 15309576 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100326 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1030^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100326 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1459^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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