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Collusion in auctions for emission permits : (Record no. 32390)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01641naa a2200241uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0041610182037
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211170953.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100416s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name BURTRAW, Dallas
9 (RLIN) 39487
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Collusion in auctions for emission permits :
Remainder of title an experimental analysis
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Hoboken :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Wiley-Blackwell,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. Fall 2009
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms - uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name GOEREE, Jacob
9 (RLIN) 39488
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HOLT, Charles A.
9 (RLIN) 24434
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MYERS, Erica
9 (RLIN) 39489
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name PALMER, Karen
9 (RLIN) 39490
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SHOBE, William
9 (RLIN) 39491
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
Related parts 28, 4, p. 672-691
Place, publisher, and date of publication Hoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Fall 2009
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 02768739
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100416
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1018^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100420
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1532^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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