Collusion in auctions for emission permits : (Record no. 32390)
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000 -LEADER | |
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fixed length control field | 01641naa a2200241uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 0041610182037 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211170953.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 100416s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | BURTRAW, Dallas |
9 (RLIN) | 39487 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Collusion in auctions for emission permits : |
Remainder of title | an experimental analysis |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Hoboken : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | Fall 2009 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms - uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | GOEREE, Jacob |
9 (RLIN) | 39488 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | HOLT, Charles A. |
9 (RLIN) | 24434 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | MYERS, Erica |
9 (RLIN) | 39489 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | PALMER, Karen |
9 (RLIN) | 39490 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | SHOBE, William |
9 (RLIN) | 39491 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management |
Related parts | 28, 4, p. 672-691 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Hoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Fall 2009 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 02768739 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20100416 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1018^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20100420 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1532^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.