The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe (Record no. 32458)
[ view plain ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02006naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0041910285037 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211171052.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | THATCHER, Mark |
| 9 (RLIN) | 10604 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Malden : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | July 2005 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Governments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principalagent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. One is that elected politicians used alternative methods of control, hence they suffered low "agency losses" and IRAs in practice had little autonomy. The other is that elected politicians found that the benefits of IRA autonomy in practice and the costs of applying their formal control outweighed agency losses, and hence accepted agency autonomy. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions |
| Related parts | 18, 3, p. 347-374 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 09521895 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100419 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1028^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100419 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1442^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
