Accountability in accounting? The politics of private rule-making in the public interest (Record no. 32461)
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|---|---|
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| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0041910330537 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211171054.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MATTLI, Walter |
| 9 (RLIN) | 6830 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Accountability in accounting? The politics of private rule-making in the public interest |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Malden : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | July 2005 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principalagent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principalagent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BÜTHE, Tim |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1643 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions |
| Related parts | 18, 3, p. 399-430 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 09521895 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100419 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1033^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100419 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1443^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
