Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism : (Record no. 32566)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02115naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0042611025837 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211171155.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | KALYTA, Paul |
| 9 (RLIN) | 39637 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism : |
| Remainder of title | a study of supplemental retirement plans |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Bognor Regis : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | April 2009 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) - historically the least transparent compensation component - on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Strategic Management Journal |
| Related parts | 30, 4, p. 405-423 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Bognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2009 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01432095 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100426 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1102^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100428 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1707^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
