The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions (Record no. 32597)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01735naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0042614594037 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211171221.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BODOLICA, Virginia |
| 9 (RLIN) | 39678 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Bognor Regis : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | September 2009 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This study investigates how the implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts is determined by both the acquisition and the acquirer features for a set of M&A deals undertaken by Canadian acquiring firms. Our findings reveal that when agency problems are higher, manifested by larger control premiums and poor firm performance, boards of directors tend to implement stronger mechanisms of incentive alignment around M&A transactions. Relying on multiple interdisciplinary logics that are activated to explain directors' ability to effectively perform their monitoring function, we show that boards are reactive rather than proactive in dealing with agency problems. Data are further interpreted in light of the unique aspects of the Canadian institutional context. Based on asymmetric risk properties of two different groups of executive compensation modes examined in this study, testing the substitution effects between alternative governance mechanisms is proposed as an interesting avenue for future research. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | SPRAGGON, Martin |
| 9 (RLIN) | 39679 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Strategic Management Journal |
| Related parts | 30, 9, p. 985-1011 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Bognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, September 2009 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01432095 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100426 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1459^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100428 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1700^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
