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When missions matter : (Record no. 32805)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02042naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0050410414537
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211171429.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100504s1995 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name KHADEMIAN, Anne M.
9 (RLIN) 20381
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title When missions matter :
Remainder of title professional priorities and the "stepchild" of supervisory programs
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Malden :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Wiley-Blackwell,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. January 1995
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. If there is a clear bottom line to the literature on political control of the bureaucracy, it is that control is never complete. Principals can be multiple, priorities diverse, preferences for policy incomplete and not articulated, and intentional choice lost in the muddle. Yet as long as bureaucratic studies remain focused upon outside political actors, or at best, the political appointee at the helm of an agency, we will not make many advances in our understanding of important organizational dynamics that act as an independent force upon the phenomenon of bureaucratic behavior. This article suggests a politically cognizant return to the bureaucracy by examining the distinct management efforts of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC to supervise the consumer and civil rights obligations of banks, known collectively as "compliance" obligations. The same mandates, issued and overseen by the same political principals, and implemented within common professional cultures, have been managed in ways that vary in the context of each agency's organizational mission. It is argued that organizational mission provides an empirical link between the priorities and mandates imposed from a system of "overhead democracy," and the influential priorities of a common professional group (bank examiners) in each of the agencies.
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Adminitration
Related parts 8, 1, p. 26-57
Place, publisher, and date of publication Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, January 1995
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 09521895
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100504
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1041^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100505
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1655^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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