Corruption cleanups in developing societies : (Record no. 33650)
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| fixed length control field | 01939naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0052716135437 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211172119.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100527s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MBAKU, John Mukum |
| 9 (RLIN) | 40644 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Corruption cleanups in developing societies : |
| Remainder of title | the public choice perspective |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Marcel Dekker, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 1999 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper employs the method of public choice to examine corruption cleanup strategies in the developing countries, with special emphasis on Africa. Most African countries have weak, inefficient and non-viable institutional arrangements and heavily regulated economies. Pervasive state intrusion in all aspects of economic activities has created many opportunities for rent seeking. Bureaucrats who are charged with implementing national development programs and enforcing the state's regulations, are able to extort bribes from entrepreneurs seeking favors from the government. Favors sought include opportunities to obtain lucrative import licenses, foreign exchange permits, access to subsidized credit, and investment and production licenses, and to minimize taxes that an enterprise must pay the state. Bureaucratic corruption, thus, is primarily rent-seeking behavior and is directly related to the scope and level of government intervention in private exchange. The politicization of resource allocation accounts for a significant part of bureaucratic corruption in the developing countries. Thus, any attempt to eliminate corruption from these societies must begin with effective institutional reforms which constitutionally limit the ability of the state to intervene in private exchange. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | International Journal of Public Administration - IJPA |
| Related parts | 22, 2, p. 309-345 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Marcel Dekker, 1999 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01900692 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100527 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1613^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100531 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1634^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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