Bureaucrats at sea : (Record no. 34434)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01741naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0061813165337 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211172845.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100618s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BRANDT, Urs Steiner |
| 9 (RLIN) | 38437 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Bureaucrats at sea : |
| Remainder of title | a budget catch model |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Oxfordshire : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Routledge, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | April 2006 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | We develop a model of bureaucratic budget catching, where bureaucracies compete for resources just like fishermen. Considering taxpayers' money a free access resource in the absence of tight fiscal control (passive sponsors), bureaucratic self-interest may induce excessive lobbying behavior even from the perspective of the bureaucrats themselves. Our contribution is to extend the original Niskanen (1971) model by suggesting that bureaucrats will expend resources on lobbying rather than provide public goods, thus rendering the bureaus more innefficient. Such decreases in public good provision affect production in society negatively in the next period, leaving fewer resources for the total group of bureaucrats. One possible empirical implication could be bureaucratic lobbying within the EU due to the institutional stronghold of the Commission. Arguably, the weak institutional position of European Parliament probably contributed to the observable priority of public goods provision. However, rigorous empirical investigations are needed in future to verify or reject our theoretical claims. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | SVENDSEN, Gert Tinggaard |
| 9 (RLIN) | 21160 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Related parts | 13, 3, p. 329-340 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Oxfordshire : Routledge, April 2006 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 13501763 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100618 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1316^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100623 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1739^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
