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Member states and the european commission : (Record no. 34624)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01688naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0062415375737
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211173053.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100624s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name DOLEYS, Thomas J.
9 (RLIN) 41327
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Member states and the european commission :
Remainder of title theoretical insights from the new economics of organization
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. London :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. October 2000
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. How to characterize the relationship between member governments and the European Commission has long been a matter of controversy among EU scholars. Although most now agree that traditional theoretical frameworks - inter-governmentalism and supranationalism - are inadequate to understand the complexities of EU governance, few viable alternatives have emerged. In this article, I provide a prospective look into a promising approach. The analytical framework is built on insights adapted from the new economics of organization (NEO). Specifically, I fuse the theoretical notion of incomplete contracting with principal - agent analytics to explain both the form and content of supranational delegation. The framework promises to offer scholars the means to get away from asking whether or not member governments dominate supranational institutions, to an inquiry wherein one can distinguish the conditions under which governments control supranational institutions from those where these institutions operate with a degree of autonomy.
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of European Public Policy
Related parts 7, 4, p. 532-553
Place, publisher, and date of publication London : Routledge, October 2000
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 13501763
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100624
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1537^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100629
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1620^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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