Impatient legislators and new issue-dimensions : (Record no. 34625)
[ view plain ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02202naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0062415391537 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211173054.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 100624s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | RITTBERGER, Berthold |
| 9 (RLIN) | 9001 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Impatient legislators and new issue-dimensions : |
| Remainder of title | a critique of the Garrett-Tsebelis standard version' of legislative politics |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | London : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Routledge, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | October 2000 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The model of EU legislative politics developed by Garrett and Tsebelis has served as the main reference point for scholars studying the EU legislative process. It stipulates that the preferences of actors in the EU legislative process (the member states, the European Parliament and the Commission) are distributed one - dimensionally along a more - less integration continuum. Furthermore, the Garrett - Tsebelis model predicts that under the rules governing the co - decision introduced at Maastricht, the European Parliament will be systematically worse off than under the provisions of the co - operation procedure and will, as a result, invariably accept any legislation proposed by the pivotal Council member state. This article argues that the Garrett - Tsebelis model falls short of explaining why the European Parliament sometimes rejects legislation. It also demonstrates that the European Parliament may actually be more influential under the co - decision procedure than Garrett and Tsebelis suggest. By analysing different directives that are subject to the co - decision procedure - thus keeping the institutional rules of co - decision constant - it can be demonstrated that actors' time horizons (their levels of impatience) and the type and salience of issue - dimensions (more or less integration, left-right, changes in institutional rules) exercise independent effects on legislators' influence and on legislative outcomes. This article thus explains cases otherwise unexplained by the 'standard version'. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Related parts | 7, 4, p. 554-575 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | London : Routledge, October 2000 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 13501763 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100624 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1539^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20100629 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1620^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
