Board composition : (Record no. 36958)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01912naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 0101914552637 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211173816.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 101019s2004 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ANDERSON, Ronald C. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 42756 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Board composition : |
| Remainder of title | balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Ithaca : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Johnson Graduate of Management, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | June 2004 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | We examine the mechanisms used to limit expropriation of firm wealth by large shareholders among S&P 500 firms with founding-family ownership. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance family board representation. In contrast, in firms with continued founding-family ownership and relatively few independent directors, firm performance is significantly worse than in non-family firms. We also find that a moderate family board presence provides substantial benefits to the firm. Additional tests suggest that families often seek to minimize the presence of independent directors, while outside shareholders seek independent director representation. These findings highlight the importance of independent directors in mitigating conflicts between shareholder groups and imply that the interests of minority investors are best protected when, through independent directors, they have power relative to family shareholders. We argue that expanding the discussion beyond manager-shareholder conflicts to include conflicts between shareholder groups provides a richer setting in which to explore corporate governance and the balance of power in U.S. firms |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | REEB, David M |
| 9 (RLIN) | 42757 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Administrative Science Quarterly |
| Related parts | 49, 2, p. 209-237 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Ithaca : Johnson Graduate of Management, June 2004 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00018392 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20101019 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1455^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20101019 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1603^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.
