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Do financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from California (Record no. 37798)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01912naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0121515052037
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211174216.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 101215s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name STEELE, Jennifer L.
9 (RLIN) 43429
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Do financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from California
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Hoboken :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Wiley-Blackwell,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. Summer 2010
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This study capitalizes on a natural experiment that occurred in California between 2000 and 2002. In those years, the state offered a competitively allocated $20,000 incentive called the Governor's Teaching Fellowship (GTF) aimed at attracting academically talented, novice teachers to low-performing schools and retaining them in those schools for at least four years. Taking advantage of data on the career histories of 27,106 individuals who pursued California teaching licenses between 1998 and 2003, we use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the unbiased impact of the GTF on the decisions of recipients to begin working in low-performing schools within 2 years after licensure program enrollment. We estimate that GTF recipients would have been less likely to teach in low-performing schools than observably similar counterparts had the GTF not existed, but that acquiring a GTF increased their probability of doing so by 28 percentage points. Examining retention patterns, we find that 75 percent of both GTF recipients and nonrecipients who began working in low-performing schools remained in such schools for at least four years
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MURNANE, Richard J.
9 (RLIN) 43430
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WILLETT, John B
9 (RLIN) 43431
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
Related parts 29, 3, p. 451-478
Place, publisher, and date of publication Hoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Summer 2010
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 02768739
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20101215
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1505^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20110118
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1735^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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