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Pay for performance in the public sector - benefits and (hidden) costs (Record no. 39410)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01968naa a2200265uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1050915234137
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211175133.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 110509s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WEIBEL, Antoinette
9 (RLIN) 44752
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Pay for performance in the public sector - benefits and (hidden) costs
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cary :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. apr. 2010
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of "pay for performance" schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which migh restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performence sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental bignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay performance in the public sector
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Reforma Administrativa
9 (RLIN) 11957
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Relações de Trabalho
9 (RLIN) 12947
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Motivação
9 (RLIN) 13028
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Remuneração
9 (RLIN) 12136
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Avaliação de Desempenho
9 (RLIN) 12937
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name ROST, Katja
9 (RLIN) 44753
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name OSTERLOH, Margit
9 (RLIN) 44754
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART
Related parts 20, 2, p. 387-412
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cary : Oxford University, apr. 2010
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 10531858
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20110509
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1523^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20120517
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1516^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Geisneer

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Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

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