Pay for performance in the public sector - benefits and (hidden) costs (Record no. 39410)
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000 -LEADER | |
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fixed length control field | 01968naa a2200265uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 1050915234137 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211175133.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 110509s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | WEIBEL, Antoinette |
9 (RLIN) | 44752 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Pay for performance in the public sector - benefits and (hidden) costs |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cary : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford University, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | apr. 2010 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of "pay for performance" schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which migh restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performence sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental bignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay performance in the public sector |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Reforma Administrativa |
9 (RLIN) | 11957 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Relações de Trabalho |
9 (RLIN) | 12947 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Motivação |
9 (RLIN) | 13028 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Remuneração |
9 (RLIN) | 12136 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Avaliação de Desempenho |
9 (RLIN) | 12937 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | ROST, Katja |
9 (RLIN) | 44753 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | OSTERLOH, Margit |
9 (RLIN) | 44754 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART |
Related parts | 20, 2, p. 387-412 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cary : Oxford University, apr. 2010 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 10531858 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20110509 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1523^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Daiane |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20120517 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1516^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Geisneer |
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