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The political payoff from performance target systems : (Record no. 39425)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02167naa a2200289uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1051115471337
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20241015062702.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 110511s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
9 (RLIN) 4904
Personal name Hood, Christopher
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The political payoff from performance target systems :
Remainder of title no-brainer or no-gainer?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cary :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. july 2010
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Assuming elected politicians have some incentive to adopt public service management systems that will help secure their reelection, this article tests 11 hypotheses about political payoffs to incumbents from ambitious performance target systems. The data come from central performance targets for health and education in Great Britain in the early 2000s and are analyzed through a "consilience approach that combines analysis of electoral and opinion poll data with analysis of press reports, legislative committee reports, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development reports, and interviews with senior civil servants. This article uses the weaker target regimes used in Scotland and Wales as against England at that time to explore the difference targets made to credit obtained by incumbent politicians. We find little clear evidence for direct electoral benefits from the tough English targets and also little evidence for symbolic benefits for the incumbent government in support from other actors. These findings prompt questions as to why politicians should have invested significant time and political capital in such a public service management system
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Incentives and Public Service Performance: a special issue
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Volume 20
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Supplement 2
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note July 2010
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Prestação de Serviço
9 (RLIN) 12129
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
9 (RLIN) 12937
Topical term or geographic name entry element Avaliação de Desempenho
651 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--GEOGRAPHIC NAME
Geographic name Inglaterra
9 (RLIN) 13196
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name DIXON, Ruth
9 (RLIN) 36049
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART
Related parts 20, 2, p. i281-i298
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cary : Oxford University, july 2010
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 10531858
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20110511
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1547^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20120517
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1523^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Geisneer

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