Keep out signs : (Record no. 40982)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01969naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 1111018135441 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211180139.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 111110s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | CLARKSON, Gavin |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33578 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Keep out signs : |
| Remainder of title | the role of deterrence in the competition for resources |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | U.S.A : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Wiley-Blackwell, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | nov. 2010 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | To explain resource heterogeneity, past research focuses on how rivals' resources are hidden from firms and firms accordingly have difficulties accessing them. We argue that resource heterogeneity may also arise when firms are deterred from a technological space upon being shown what resources rivals already possess within that space. To illustrate this deterrence effect, we use patent reexamination certificates, which indicate strategic stakes within a technological space without materially disclosing additional details of the underlying technologies and hence avoid the confounding effect of attracting competition through disclosure. We demonstrate how rivals' reexamination certificates within a technological space induce a firm to subsequently allocate less inventive effort in that space, based on two mechanismsindications of rivals' developmental speed and exclusionary ability. We further develop these two mechanisms by arguing that the deterrence effect is stronger when rivals' speed is enhanced by their downstream capabilities, or when rivals' exclusion is enhanced by their litigation experiences. Findings suggest that a firm's path of resource accumulation evolves through avoidance of rivals' paths, and deterrence may constitute a viable alternative theory of resource heterogeneity. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | TOH, Puay Khoon |
| 9 (RLIN) | 45384 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Strategic Management Journal |
| Related parts | 31, 11, p. 1202-1225 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | U.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, nov. 2010 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01432095 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20111110 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1813^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Geisneer |
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