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More order with less law : (Record no. 7518)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01680naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 7365
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211154244.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 020927s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name BOHNET, Iris
9 (RLIN) 1249
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title More order with less law :
Remainder of title on contract enforcement, trust, and crowding
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2001
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law" it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preferece adaptation and find that economic icentives have a nomonotonic effect on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement if strong or weak bytnot with medium enforcment probabilities: trustworthiness is "crowded in" with weak and "crowded out" with medium enforcment. In a laboratory experiment we test oru model`s implication an find support for the crowding predication. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trast in formley Communist coutries
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name FREY, Bruno S
9 (RLIN) 16874
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HUCK, Steffen
9 (RLIN) 16875
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 95, 1, p. 131-145
Place, publisher, and date of publication , 2001
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20020927
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) Cassio
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Cassio
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20060515
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1515^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Quiteria
Holdings
Status de empréstimo Status de perda Status de danificação Restrição de uso Não pode ser emprestado Código da coleção Localização permanente Localização atual Data de aquisição Date last seen Preço efetivo a partir de Tipo de material
          Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos 2017-09-27 2017-09-27 2017-09-27 Periódico

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Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
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