000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02571naa a2200193uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
control field |
8532 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20190211154505.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
021121s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
DeHART-DAVIS, Leisha |
9 (RLIN) |
2802 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Regulatory compliance and air quality permiting : |
Remainder of title |
why do firms overcomply? |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2001 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
Industry overcompliance with pollution standards has puzzled economists, leading to a variety of hypotheses about the objectives companies expect to achieve by doing so. This article examines the possbility of overcompliance with a different type of environmental regulation : the paperwork requirements for completing a federal Title V air operating permit application. We suggest that unique political circumstances set the stage for companies to overcomply with their title V permit application requirements, including tremendous regulatory uncertainty, stiff penalities for intentional corporate noncompliance, and consultants who allegedly were eager to capitaliza on both circumstances to sell their services. This regulatory context led us to hypothesize that corporate Title V overcompliance was driven by four factors: a complying organization`s internal control processes and red tape; its permitting experience; the quality and quantity of contact with state regulators; and whether the company subcontracted its compliance-related activities. To test the influence of these factors, we analyzed survey data from more than five hundred companies in four states. The result indicate that, while internal red tape and permit inexperience were insignificant cost influences, both the increaed contatct with regulators and the use of consultants corresponded with higher Title V costs and, by extension, the probability of overcompliance. In contrast to expectations, the presence of regulated facilities in other states was associated with significantly higher Title V costs, perhaps due to inflationary effects of cross-state permit coordinations. While caution is warranted in interpretation, the results spark the possibility taht communicating extensively with regulators and subcontracting compliance tasks - particularly under conditions of regulatory uncertainty and right perceived noncompliance risks - may lead companies to overly expansive compliance with permit processes |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
9 (RLIN) |
1399 |
Personal name |
Bozeman, Barry |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
Title |
Journal of public administration |
Related parts |
11, 4, p. 471-508 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication |
, 2001 |
Record control number |
|
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Koha item type |
Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20021121 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Cassio |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Cassio |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20060620 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1633^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Quiteria |