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The evolution of political intelligence : (Record no. 8783)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01684naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8638
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211154518.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 021126s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name ORBELL, John
9 (RLIN) 7975
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The evolution of political intelligence :
Remainder of title simulation results
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2002
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Several bodies of theory develop the idea that the intelligence of highly social animals - most interestingly, human - is significantly organized aroun the adaptive problems posed by their sociality. By this `political intelligence" hypothesis, sociality selects for, among other attributes, capacities for `manipulating' information others can gather about one's own future behaviour, and for `mindreading' such manipulations by others. Yet we have little theory about how diverse parameters of the games that social animal play select for political intelligence. We begin to address that with an evolutionary simulation n which agents choose between playing Prisioner's Dilemma and Hawk - dove games on the basis of the information they can retrieve about each other given four broad information processing capacities. We show that political intelligence - operationally, the aggregate of those four capacities - evolves to its highest levels when co-operative games are generally more attractive than conflictual ones, but when conflictual games are at least sometimes also attractive
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MORIKAWA, Tomonori
9 (RLIN) 17965
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name ALLEN, Nicholas
9 (RLIN) 17966
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title British Journal of Political Science
Related parts 32, 4, p. 613-639
Place, publisher, and date of publication , 2002
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20021126
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) Lucima
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Lucimara
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20060626
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1427^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Quiteria
Holdings
Status de empréstimo Status de perda Status de danificação Restrição de uso Não pode ser emprestado Código da coleção Localização permanente Localização atual Data de aquisição Date last seen Preço efetivo a partir de Tipo de material
          Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos 2017-09-27 2017-09-27 2017-09-27 Periódico

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Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
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