For most of the twentieth century, public land managers in the United States suppressed virtually all wildland fires. This surppression philosophy contributed to unhealthy ecosystems and allowed a dangerous buildup of burnable vegetation. As a result of generations of fire suppression, recent years have seenb an increased incidence of catastrophic fires in American wildlands. Following some of the worst fire seasons in American history, representatives from several federal agencies promulgated the 1995 National Fire Policy, updated in 2001. The National Fire Policy, and the subsequent National Fire Plan passed by Congress, acknowledged the importance of fire in natural systems, replacing the suppression philosophy with directions that wildland fire should be used as a tool by forest managers to restore and maintain ecosystem health. Fueled by high profile incidents such as the prescribed burn gone awry at Cerro Grande in 2000, critics have pointed to the lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms for agencies in charge of implementing the National Fire Policy and Plan. Fixing blame for catastrophic events should not be the only goal of accountability systems, however. Accountability systems interact with other important variables in the management context, including risk. Risk perception and risk management issues significantly influence managerial decision making. Moreover, organizational incentives and disincentives for risk taking can heavily influence managerial risk propensity, which can have important consequences for program implementation. Accountability systems may affect managerial perception of risks and thus managerial risk propensity. This article examines the relationship between accountability systems and risk management in the context of the National Fire Policy, arguing that accountability and risk should be treated as systemic and related matters within public programs