Efficiency or credibility? Testing the two logics of delegation to the European Commision
By: FRANCHINO, Fabio
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Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
This article critically elaborates Majone's argument that there are two logics underlying the delgeation of powers to the European Commission: the logic of efficiency and the logic of credibility. It analyses 601 provisions of secondary legislation and suggests a method to distinguish the two rationales. It then correlates executive powers with statutory constraints. a surprising result is that these constraints are more associated, in general, with credibility-based than with efficiency-based delegation: howeve, statutory constraints that facilitate control by national state actors are more likely to be associated with efficiency-based delegation. The article concludes by emphasizing that different strategies of control are related to different underlying motivations to delegate
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