Powering, puzzling, and `pacting' : the informational logic of negotiates reforms
By: CULPEPPER, Pepper D
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: October 2002Subject(s): Contrato Social | Corporativismo | Empregadores | Capital Humano | Sindicato | Welfare StatesJournal of European Public Policy 9, 5, p. 774-790Abstract: Across Europe, contemporary negotiated reforms of economic and social policy are increasingly characterized by a logic of information rather than a logic of exhange. Unlike in neo-corporatist bargaining over incomes policies, states negotiate with the social partners not primarily to secure their acquiescence, but instead to enlist their active assistance in designing and mobilizing support for substantial reforms of public policy. State policy-makers lack the combination of technical, relational, and local informatin necessary to design succesful bluenprints for reform, and so they are dependent on the social partners to acquire this informaton. In systems in which unions and employers' associations can exercise dialogic capacity, policy innovation is more likely to come from the propositions of the social partners than from political parties or bureaucrats. Using this logic, the article undertakes a pairwise comparison of episodes of negotiated reform: pension in France and Italy, and vocational training in France and Germany
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Across Europe, contemporary negotiated reforms of economic and social policy are increasingly characterized by a logic of information rather than a logic of exhange. Unlike in neo-corporatist bargaining over incomes policies, states negotiate with the social partners not primarily to secure their acquiescence, but instead to enlist their active assistance in designing and mobilizing support for substantial reforms of public policy. State policy-makers lack the combination of technical, relational, and local informatin necessary to design succesful bluenprints for reform, and so they are dependent on the social partners to acquire this informaton. In systems in which unions and employers' associations can exercise dialogic capacity, policy innovation is more likely to come from the propositions of the social partners than from political parties or bureaucrats. Using this logic, the article undertakes a pairwise comparison of episodes of negotiated reform: pension in France and Italy, and vocational training in France and Germany
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