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Out of step, out of office : electoral accountability and house members' voting

By: CANES-WRONE, Brandice.
Contributor(s): BRADY, David W | COGAN, John f.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: mar.2002American Political Science Review 96, 1, p. 127-140Abstract: Does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents' electoral performance and roll-call support for their party - controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors - through a series of tests of the 1956-1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member's probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members
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Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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Does a typical house member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents' electoral performance and roll-call support for their party - controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors - through a series of tests of the 1956-1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member's probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members

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