Cooperative or controlling? Relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures
By: GULATI, Ranjay
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Contributor(s): WESTPHAL, James D
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Material type: ![materialTypeLabel](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/AR.png)
Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
This study examines the influence of the social network of board interlocks on strategic alliance formation. Our theoretical framework suggests how board interlock ties to other firms can increase of decrease the likelihood of alliance formation, depending on the content of relationships between CEOs (chief executive officers) and outside directors. Results suggest that CEO-board relationships characterized by independent board control reduce the likelihood of aliance formation by prompting distrust between corporate leaders, while CEO-board coperatio in strategic decsion making appears to promote alliance formation by enhancing trust. The findings also showhow the effects of direct interlock ties are amplified further by third-party network ties
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