Cabinet terminations and critical events
By: DIERMEIER, Daniel
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Contributor(s): STEVENSON, Randolph T.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 3, p. 627-640Abstract: We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strom` noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches:(1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet`s risks of being replaced withou an intermdiate electing may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametic duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strom model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternatve, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strom` noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches:(1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet`s risks of being replaced withou an intermdiate electing may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametic duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strom model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternatve, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability
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