Buying supermajorities infinite legislatures
By: BANKS, Jeffrey S
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 3, p. 677-682Abstract: I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal majority and univeral coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal majority and univeral coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect
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