Vote buying supermajorities, and flooded coalitions
By: GROSECLOSE, Tim
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Contributor(s): SNYDER, James.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 3, p. 683-684Abstract: In a recent paper, Banks (2000), adopting the framework of our model (Groseclose and Snyder 1996), derives several new and noteworthy results. In addition, he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4. Here we explain the error in our porposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assuption:in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition, that is, she does not bribe every member of her coalition. We conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of Bank`s proposition 1; we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote-buying game
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
In a recent paper, Banks (2000), adopting the framework of our model (Groseclose and Snyder 1996), derives several new and noteworthy results. In addition, he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4. Here we explain the error in our porposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assuption:in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition, that is, she does not bribe every member of her coalition. We conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of Bank`s proposition 1; we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote-buying game
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