A cross-validation of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's international interaction game
By: BENNET, D. Scott
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Contributor(s): STAM, Allan C.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: oct. 2000British Journal of Political Science 30 , part 4, p. 541-560Abstract: Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war is one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged it theoretical development. to date, the theory has been tested on only 707 dayad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a broader test of war and reason's expected utility theory of war using the same methods as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. Our tests include the full internationbal system from 1816-1984. We find that the theory receives empirical support using the set of politically relevant dyads for testing, but the relationship is less clear among the population of all intersated dyads
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war is one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged it theoretical development. to date, the theory has been tested on only 707 dayad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a broader test of war and reason's expected utility theory of war using the same methods as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. Our tests include the full internationbal system from 1816-1984. We find that the theory receives empirical support using the set of politically relevant dyads for testing, but the relationship is less clear among the population of all intersated dyads
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