Coordination, moderation, and institutional balancing in American presidential and house elections
By: MEBANE, Walter R., Jr
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 1, p. 37-58Abstract: Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election year, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976-96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategicaly to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixe-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the ourcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderatin has usually been based on voters` expectations whta the president wil be at least an equal of the House of determining postelection policy
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Voters have been coordinating their choices for president and House of Representatives in recent presidential election year, with each voter using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is defined as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among voters, in which each voter has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level NES data from 1976-96 support coordination versus a model in which voters act nonstrategicaly to moderate policy. The empirical coordinating model satisfies the fixe-point condition that defines the common knowledge expectation voters have about the ourcome in the theoretical equilibrium. The proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the House with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes. Moderatin has usually been based on voters` expectations whta the president wil be at least an equal of the House of determining postelection policy
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