Senate representation and coalition building in distributive politics
Contributor(s): LEE, Frances E.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 1, p. 59-72Abstract: The Senate`s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have for greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weith. As a result, even though all senators` votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal "price". Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to proram budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on format models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997-98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses
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The Senate`s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have for greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weith. As a result, even though all senators` votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal "price". Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to proram budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on format models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997-98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses
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