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Cost plus incentive fee contracting - experiences and structuring

By: BERENDS, T.C.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: jun.2000Subject(s): Contracting Cost Plus Contracts | Incentives ContractsInternational Journal of Project Management 18, 3, p. 165-171Abstract: In this paper the contractual relationship between owner and /Engineering contractor during the development and implementation of capital investment project is considered. The described Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract type provides a mechanism for allocating project cost risk to the owner, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best place to manage the cost risk. The results of an analysis of eight case studies case studies involving major capital investment projects from the oil and chemicals industry are presented and a quantitative methodology for structuring incentives shemes is described and illustrated
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Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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In this paper the contractual relationship between owner and /Engineering contractor during the development and implementation of capital investment project is considered. The described Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract type provides a mechanism for allocating project cost risk to the owner, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best place to manage the cost risk. The results of an analysis of eight case studies case studies involving major capital investment projects from the oil and chemicals industry are presented and a quantitative methodology for structuring incentives shemes is described and illustrated

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