At the commission`s discretion : cartelbusting and fining infrigements under the EU`s restrictive practices policy
By: MCGOWAN, Lee.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: R.A.W. Rhodes, 2000Public Administration: an international quarterly 78, 3, p. 639-656Abstract: Although the last decade has seen an increased interest from political science in many aspects of EU competition policy the issue of cartelbusting has been almost totally neglected. This is a curious situation given that this remains by far the major aspect of the European Commission`s activities in the competition arena. By merging the available, albeit extremely limited, public administration and policy studies literature with the legal literature the article endevours to begin to redress the balance by examining the EU`s restrictive practices policy. It pays particular attention to the European Comission and its Directorate General responsible form competition policy (DGIV) and their activities in their enduring war against cartels. At its core this article analyses the commission`s quasi-judicial authority in relation to cartel arrangements , identifies the extent to which the decision-making process is open to substantial degrees of administrative discretion within DGIV and makes specific reference to its policy on fining infringementsItem type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Although the last decade has seen an increased interest from political science in many aspects of EU competition policy the issue of cartelbusting has been almost totally neglected. This is a curious situation given that this remains by far the major aspect of the European Commission`s activities in the competition arena. By merging the available, albeit extremely limited, public administration and policy studies literature with the legal literature the article endevours to begin to redress the balance by examining the EU`s restrictive practices policy. It pays particular attention to the European Comission and its Directorate General responsible form competition policy (DGIV) and their activities in their enduring war against cartels. At its core this article analyses the commission`s quasi-judicial authority in relation to cartel arrangements , identifies the extent to which the decision-making process is open to substantial degrees of administrative discretion within DGIV and makes specific reference to its policy on fining infringements
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