The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency
By: TALLBERG, Jonas.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: Jeremy Richardson, feb. 2003Subject(s): Área de Livre Comércio | Agenda Pública | Empreendedorismo | Liderança | Sistema de Governo | EuropaJournal of European Public Policy 10 , 1, p. 1-19Abstract: Existing literature is overwhelmingly sceptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency`s ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a "responsabilite sans pouvior". This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distiguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision-making developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999-2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and BelgiumItem type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Existing literature is overwhelmingly sceptical about the capacity of the Council Presidency to shape the EU agenda. The Presidency`s ability to promote private concerns is considered highly limited and, typically, the Presidency is depicted as a "responsabilite sans pouvior". This article challenges the conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework that expands the notion of influence, by distiguishing between three forms of agenda-shaping: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion. In this exercise, I draw on theories of bargaining and decision-making developed in international relations and American politics. Empirically, the article provides an inventory of the instruments available to the Presidency within each form of agenda-shaping, as well as illustrative cases that demonstrate how Presidencies regularly influence outcomes in EU policy-making. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the six consecutive Presidencies in the period 1999-2001: Germany, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium
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