Regulatory regimes, agency actions, and the conditional nature of congressional influence
By: SHIPAN, Charles R
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ArticlePublisher: New York : Cambridge University Press, August 2004American Political Science Review 98, 3, p. 467-480Abstract: Political bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States. To examine the extent to wich these agency actions are responsive to the preferences of elected officials, in particular, Congress, I develop a spatial model of oversight. The most important insight of this theory is that agencies make policy decisions within given regimes and may be constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times. To test the theory, I collect and analyze data on the monitoring activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I find that under certain conditions, the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously.
Political bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States. To examine the extent to wich these agency actions are responsive to the preferences of elected officials, in particular, Congress, I develop a spatial model of oversight. The most important insight of this theory is that agencies make policy decisions within given regimes and may be constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times. To test the theory, I collect and analyze data on the monitoring activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I find that under certain conditions, the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously.
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