Impoundment at the state level : executive power and budget impact
By: DOUGLAS, James W.; HOFFMAN, Kim U
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ArticlePublisher: Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications, September 2004Subject(s): Orçamento | Impoundment | State: RescissionThe American Review of Public Administration 34, 3, p. 252-258Abstract: Presidential impoundment authority has been given extensive attention in the budgeting literature. Little research, however, has examined impoundment powers at the state level. This research note is an exploratory sutdy of impoundment powers at the state level, focusing primarily on gubernatorial rescission authority. We use a survey of executive budgeting officers to examine the structure, use, and effectiveness of impoundment powers in the states. We find that gubernatorial impoundment authority is generally used to maintain balanced budgets during times of revenue shortfall. We also find that impoundments do not serve as particularly effective policy mechanism for most governors.
Presidential impoundment authority has been given extensive attention in the budgeting literature. Little research, however, has examined impoundment powers at the state level. This research note is an exploratory sutdy of impoundment powers at the state level, focusing primarily on gubernatorial rescission authority. We use a survey of executive budgeting officers to examine the structure, use, and effectiveness of impoundment powers in the states. We find that gubernatorial impoundment authority is generally used to maintain balanced budgets during times of revenue shortfall. We also find that impoundments do not serve as particularly effective policy mechanism for most governors.
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