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The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States

By: Lewis, David E, 1970-.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, July 2004British Journal of Political Science 34, 3, p. 377-404Abstract: The US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control. Wheter or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune from presidential direction, this has potentially fall consequences for the president's ability to manage the executive branch. Modern presidents will preside over a less and less manageable bureaucracy over time. This article explains why agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies and shows that they have a significantly higher expected duration than other agencies. The conclusion is that modern American presidents preside over a bureaucracy that is insulated from their control
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The US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control. Wheter or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune from presidential direction, this has potentially fall consequences for the president's ability to manage the executive branch. Modern presidents will preside over a less and less manageable bureaucracy over time. This article explains why agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies and shows that they have a significantly higher expected duration than other agencies. The conclusion is that modern American presidents preside over a bureaucracy that is insulated from their control

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