The issue of when, how and why the court may remedy the unconstitutional exercise of administrative discretion is largely unexplored. This study explores the relationship between discretion and the Charter and argues for a broader, more contextual approach to remedying the source of unconstitutional discretion. Guidance as to how to exercise broad discretionary authority comes in the form of "soft law," which encompasses a variety of non-legislative instruments such as policy guidelines and training materials, and which, more informally, extends to administrative culture. Administrative discretion involves choices and judgements usually shaped by a range of legal, bureaucratic, social and personal factors. Under present jurisprudence, the less precise a statutory discretion and the greater the reliance on non-legislative guidelines, the more difficult that discretion will be to subject to constitutional scrutiny. This article challenges this logic and concludes that respect for governmental accountability and the rule of law require bringing soft law out of the constitutional shadows. The first part of the analysis examines the regulation of discretion generally and soft law specifically outside the Charter. The second part analyses the leading case law on the regulation of discretion under the Charter. The third section explores the intersection of discretion, soft law and the Charter. Finally, the fourth section considers the problem of remedying unconstitutional exercises of discretionary authority. Alternative principles are suggested for the development and application of soft law, which envisions a central role for the Charter in rendering the discretionary decision-making process more accountable and just