What Constrains or Facilitates Divestitures of Formerly Acquired Firms? The Effects of Organizational Inertia
By: SIMIZU, Katsuhiko.
Contributor(s): HITT, Michael A.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: London : Sage, February 2005Journal of management : J.O.M 31, 1, p. 50-72Abstract: This study examined behavioral explanations for the divestitures of formerly acquired units, particularly organizational inertia. It was argued that characteristics of parent firms and divested units reduce the likelihood of divesting a poorly performing unit. Conversely, it was also argued that change of key personnel and effective governance mechanisms increase the likelihood of such divestitures. Importantly, the results show that with age and size combined, appointment of new outside directors and divestiture experience (among other variables) moderated the effects on the likelihood of firms divesting units they had previously acquired. Implications for future theory development and management practice are also discussedThis study examined behavioral explanations for the divestitures of formerly acquired units, particularly organizational inertia. It was argued that characteristics of parent firms and divested units reduce the likelihood of divesting a poorly performing unit. Conversely, it was also argued that change of key personnel and effective governance mechanisms increase the likelihood of such divestitures. Importantly, the results show that with age and size combined, appointment of new outside directors and divestiture experience (among other variables) moderated the effects on the likelihood of firms divesting units they had previously acquired. Implications for future theory development and management practice are also discussed
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