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The impact of principal–agent relationship and contract type on communication between project owner and manager

By: MÜLLER, Ralf.
Contributor(s): TURNER, J. Rodney.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Amsterdam : Elsevier, July 2005Subject(s): Agente Principal | Custos de Transação Economia | Contratante | ComunicaçãoInternational Journal of Project Management 23, 5, p. 398-403 Abstract: Communication structures between project owners and project managers are influenced by the principal–agent relationship between the parties and the contract type chosen. Empirical research results on project owner–manager communication practices are mapped against the contractual communication requirements in projects. This identifies possible risk factors for projects, based on a conflict between ‘best’ communication for a project and suggested communication through the chosen contract type. The paper provides recommendations for risk-minimizing owner–manager communication, as well as contributions to project theory by showing the differences of principal–agent theory and transaction costs economics in minimizing costs for governing projects.
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Communication structures between project owners and project managers are influenced by the principal–agent relationship between the parties and the contract type chosen. Empirical research results on project owner–manager communication practices are mapped against the contractual communication requirements in projects. This identifies possible risk factors for projects, based on a conflict between ‘best’ communication for a project and suggested communication through the chosen contract type. The paper provides recommendations for risk-minimizing owner–manager communication, as well as contributions to project theory by showing the differences of principal–agent theory and transaction costs economics in minimizing costs for governing projects.

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