Impacto das instituições estaduais na unidade das coalizões parlamentares no Brasil
By: CAREY, John M
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Contributor(s): REINHARDT, Gina Yannitell.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Rio de Janeiro : IUPERJ, 2003Subject(s): Legislatures | Voting | Governors | Electoral rules | CoalitionsOnline resources: Acesso Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais 46, 4, p. 773-804Abstract: Research on political institutions suggests that sub-national factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together. We estimate the effects of such forces operating at the State-level intra-list electoral competition, and alliance with governors. We propose that larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, should be less unified than smaller cohorts. We also derive from theoretical hypotheses that cohorts allied with governors may be either more or less unified than other cohorts. We analyze unity among coalition cohorts on recorded floor votes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. We find support for the hypothesis that larger cohorts are less unified, but detect no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape their influence relative to national-level legislative actors.
Research on political institutions suggests that sub-national factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together. We estimate the effects of such forces operating at the State-level intra-list electoral competition, and alliance with governors. We propose that larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, should be less unified than smaller cohorts. We also derive from theoretical hypotheses that cohorts allied with governors may be either more or less unified than other cohorts. We analyze unity among coalition cohorts on recorded floor votes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. We find support for the hypothesis that larger cohorts are less unified, but detect no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape their influence relative to national-level legislative actors.
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