Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento
By: ALMEIDA, Rodrigo Octávio Marques de
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ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, out./dez. 2005Online resources: Acesso Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 25, 4, p. 454-475Abstract: Renegotiation of the public debt in conditions of excessive debt. This paper studies the debt overhang models and maturity management models, and analyses both theoretically and historically the debt renegotiations which the final outcome is a lower public debt burden. From the theoretical view the renegotiation plans can be Pareto improving, both creditors and debtors can be better-off, and the value of the new debt will price the new reputation and debtors' willingness to pay. From the historical point of view, funded debts were the instrument that debtors used to improve reputation
Renegotiation of the public debt in conditions of excessive debt. This paper studies the debt overhang models and maturity management models, and analyses both theoretically and historically the debt renegotiations which the final outcome is a lower public debt burden. From the theoretical view the renegotiation plans can be Pareto improving, both creditors and debtors can be better-off, and the value of the new debt will price the new reputation and debtors' willingness to pay. From the historical point of view, funded debts were the instrument that debtors used to improve reputation
Outubro Dezembro 2005
v. 25 n. 4 (100)
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