<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › Details for: Thinking the unthinkable in public administration :
Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Thinking the unthinkable in public administration : a case for spoils in the federal bureaucracy

By: Maranto, Robert.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Thousand Oaks : SAGE, January 1998Administration & Society 29, 6, p. 623-642Abstract: This article argues for ending tenure in the federal civil service. Arguments for tenure, and by extension against the old spoils system, are lacking. Even in the 19th century, relatively few federal managers lost their jobs after party changes. At the same time, limited rotation made the civil service relatively innovative and legitimate. Today, media scrutiny, more programmatic parties and presidents, and the limited capacity of the White House suggest that if presidential appointment authority were vastly expanded, the results would be modest. Such results as would occur might empower political leaders to accomplish more of their objectives and to remake under performing organizations, as well as empower career managers (who would still exist) to better lead their organizations. Each tendency would increase the effectiveness, representation, and legitimacy of the bureaucracy without necessarily increasing corruption. My arguments do not apply to state and local governments, which often operate in less competitive political environments
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

This article argues for ending tenure in the federal civil service. Arguments for tenure, and by extension against the old spoils system, are lacking. Even in the 19th century, relatively few federal managers lost their jobs after party changes. At the same time, limited rotation made the civil service relatively innovative and legitimate. Today, media scrutiny, more programmatic parties and presidents, and the limited capacity of the White House suggest that if presidential appointment authority were vastly expanded, the results would be modest. Such results as would occur might empower political leaders to accomplish more of their objectives and to remake under performing organizations, as well as empower career managers (who would still exist) to better lead their organizations. Each tendency would increase the effectiveness, representation, and legitimacy of the bureaucracy without necessarily increasing corruption. My arguments do not apply to state and local governments, which often operate in less competitive political environments

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Click on an image to view it in the image viewer

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha